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A Problem With Words 
Harry Walker 
 Christian Moderns: Freedom and fetish in the mission encounter By Webb 
Keane 
One day in the course of fieldwork with the Amazonian Urarina, I was asked to assist in 
the healing of a gravely ill young child. My elderly companion wanted me to teach him 
Christian prayer, which he claimed to have once seen work miracles when used by an 
evangelised Urarina man living much further downstream. Such prayer might usefully 
supplement his own incantations, which he said were not on this occasion proving 
effective. As examples of the genre known locally as baau, such incantations involve 
fixed verbal formulae, passed down through the generations, and whispered into tiny 
bowls of breast milk which are then fed to the child by his mother, in the hope that the 
words will enter the bloodstream and there take effect. After protesting that I was really 
the wrong person to ask, I found myself suggesting that no set formula was required for 
Christian prayer; that the trick was to speak sincerely and spontaneously from the heart in 
the hope that God might hear one’s words and intervene accordingly. My companion 
seemed deeply sceptical of this possibility, however, and replied – not unreasonably – 
that someone more knowledgeable than I might be able to teach him to pray properly, but 
that in the meantime he had best continue with his chanting. 
Conflicting assumptions about the nature of language and its effects on the world is a 
topic of interest not only to anthropologists and Urarina elders, of course. At the start of 
the twentieth century, writing from his remote outpost in the recently expanded Dutch 
East Indies, the young missionary Douwe Klaas Wielenga struggled with these issues as 
he considered the obstacles he faced in his attempts to convert the natives. To begin with, 
God seemed to exist for them ‘only in faint recollection’, seated high above the clouds, 
aloof and mostly ignored. But no less worryingly, the Sumbanese – mostly followers of 
an ancestor-focused ritual practice known as marapu – were engaged in a series of errors, 
or misattributions, that appeared to rob humans of their proper place in the world: “The 
primitives confound that which is a fruit of the imagination with the reality, the objective 
with the subjective, the outer phenomena with their own spirit life”. Among other 
concerns, Sumbanese ‘prayers’ took a dialogical form and were typically addressed to 
spirits, animals and material objects. Extraordinary powers were even attributed to the 
words themselves, which were seen to have an ability to impact on or transform the world 
that supposedly derived from their direct connection to the primordial ancestors. 
This takes us, then, to the classic problem of the fetish: intrinsically linked to situations of 
encounter, it involves an accusation that someone is attributing a false value to objects, 
including words, and thereby blurring the proper boundaries between persons and things. 
Underlying the missionary’s talk of reality and illusion, of knowledge and error, lay a 
deeper question of where to locate moral responsibility. In ascribing agency to things that 
in truth lack it, the Sumbanese were seen to be denying it not only to God, but to 
themselves – a seductive as well as dangerous error from a Protestant perspective.  By 
believing that evil arose from outside themselves, in malicious spirits and the like, they 
were condemned to live in a permanent state of fear. Their brand of fatalism effectively 
implied that one’s virtues and vices had been determined in advance, and in failing to 
take full responsibility for their actions, they lacked an adequate sense of guilt, and hence 
consciousness of sin. Full moral competence required an ability to recognise oneself as 
the sole and unique author of one’s words and actions. This demanded an appropriate 
sense of personal autonomy and independence from the illusory influence of external 
forces or agents. In short, it required drawing a clear line between the private, inner self 
and outward worldly existence. 
The differences between the Protestant missionaries and the marapu ritualists were neatly 
encapsulated in their respective understandings of the nature of language, which quickly 
became an issue of vital concern because of the centrality of language to the religious and 
social life of both groups. The invisible inner soul and strong sense of personal interiority 
postulated by the missionaries has, as its counterpart, a particular view of the nature of 
language. This is seen most clearly in ideas surrounding prayer. Simply put, words should 
come from, and express the will of, the sincere individual speaker. This idea was 
diametrically opposed to the fixed and highly formal canon of couplets used in marapu 
ritual: comprising words said to have been passed down unchanged from the ancestors, 
their value to the Sumbanese derived precisely from the fact that the speaker was not 
their author, or the agent of the actions they perform. This recognition further accorded 
the words themselves a certain objective, thing-like quality. Instead of expressing some 
inner mental state, or reflecting the nature of reality, words for the Sumbanese were 
intrinsically about performing an action. Just as they commonly held that the causes of 
their own actions arose outside themselves, so too they viewed the most effective kinds 
of words as originating with others. From the standpoint of Protestantism, this decentred 
model of speech and action encouraged an irresponsible disregard for the power of the 
human individual to create meaning and shape social life. Yet in return, the marapu 
ritualists viewed the Protestants’ claims to direct, unmediated communication with God 
as the height of human folly and arrogance. 
Webb Keane’s sophisticated discussion of this ideological encounter opens in fact not in 
Indonesia but in 17th century England. John Milton has just written a polemic against 
royal tyranny in which he attacks the use of fixed, published prayers, such as those that 
appeared in the Book of Common Prayer. His problem is not with the words in 
themselves, but in the way they restrict one’s freedom to speak. To follow a published 
text when praying, he claims, is to submit one’s inner spirit to the ‘outward dictates of 
men’, and is equivalent to committing an act of idolatry. Keane swiftly draws a parallel to 
the complaints he heard local Calvinists direct against Catholics in 1990s Indonesia. 
While the former pray with their eyes shut so that they can speak from within, Catholics 
pray with their eyes open, so they can read their prayer book. As such, they were said to 
be little better than the backward marapu followers who worshipped stones and other 
fetishes. Indeed, Catholics could even be found worshipping statues of the virgin. 
Submitting to fixed forms of language, like submitting to statues, threatens to rob humans 
of the independence and agency that is rightfully theirs. 
Such global resonances would justify an analysis against the backdrop of the master 
narratives of modernity: that constellation of processes variously labelled 
individualization, abstraction, objectification, purification, interiorization, and so on – 
along with, often, secularization. While encapsulating a certain drive or tendency 
typically associated with the Enlightenment and the rise of science, Keane wishes instead 
to demonstrate the historical role of Protestantism, and more specifically Calvinism. 
While many of the ways in which Protestantism has been historically entangled with 
modernity are fairly well-known, we are far from the line of enquiry made famous by 
Weber, in which the distinctly moral ‘this-worldly asceticism’ of Puritanism, demanding 
heightened self-discipline, paved the way for the development of rational capitalism by 
combining a frugal lifestyle with an impulse to accumulation.  Keane writes squarely in 
the tradition that treats modernity less as a set of institutions than as a particular kind of 
culture, comprising above all assumptions about human beings, their rights and agency, 
and the nature of meaning. 
In some respects, all these concerns recall older debates surrounding the opposition 
between primitive religion and science. The latter was seen to have moved beyond a 
personalised view of the surrounding world, potentially influenced by the priest or 
magician, by invoking instead an impersonal mechanism of cause and effect. A present-
day echo of these debates centres on the notion of ‘ontology’, though this is not a term 
much used by Keane. Instead, he develops the notion of ‘semiotic ideology’, which ties a 
similar concern with the (ontological) question of what kinds of beings inhabit the world 
to an analysis of underlying assumptions about the nature of signs, including not only 
language but objects too. While both concepts – that is, both ‘ontology’ and ‘semiotic 
ideology’ – seek to relativize the modern worldview, the latter has the potential 
advantage of drawing attention to questions of politics and history, questions all too often 
lacking in many discussions of ontology, including, for example, in the literature on 
perspectivism. That said, Keane himself does not pay much attention to real relations of 
power, for example in the sense of what an ideology might conceal: hence marapu ritual 
speech is linked to the abstract constraint of ‘tradition’, but not to the authority of those 
certain male practitioners which it presumably serves to legitimise. He is similarly much 
more interested in cultural concepts of agency than in peoples’ actual ability or inability 
to act on the world, to manipulate social outcomes in directions of their choosing. 
In case these issues should seem relevant only at the margins of Western civilization, 
consider for a moment contemporary debates surrounding freedom of speech. 
Justification of censorship very often hinges on the question of whether certain words or 
gestures are properly construed as mere ‘expressions’ of a viewpoint – valid in principle, 
even if distasteful – or as injurious speech ‘acts’ whose victims deserve protection. Judith 
Butler insightfully discusses the case of R.A.V.  v. St. Paul[1], in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court considered a white teenager’s burning of a cross in front of a black family’s house 
to be an example of free ‘speech’ potentially protected under the First Amendment, rather 
than an act of intimidation and violence. In general, she points out, arguments that insist 
that speech acts are speech rather than conduct work in favour of suspending state 
intervention, while arguments in favour of collapsing the speech/conduct distinction tend 
to strengthen the case for state regulation. Very similar issues are raised in relation to 
pornography, claimed by some to itself be a kind of ‘hate speech’ with the power to act 
on and debase women in harmful ways, but by others to constitute a form of free 
expression, art, or ‘mere’ representation. Conversely, the rationales presented in favour of 
the U.S. military’s ban on declarations of homosexuality, as self-definition, reveal a 
concern that such speech poses a greater danger than the tacit operation of the sexual 
practice itself. In fact, the Pentagon’s own policy guidelines explicitly deem ‘a statement 
that the member is homosexual’ to be tantamount to ‘homosexual conduct’ – in short, to 
be a ritualised form of speech that wields the power to enact what it says. 
Such cases make clear that political positions do not map straightforwardly onto 
linguistic ideologies; as elsewhere, the ways in which words and other objects act on the 
world is open to debate. Further difficulties arise when one is forced to consider issues of 
accountability: the efficacy of speech acts often relies on their formulaic, conventional 
qualities, not at all unlike the ritual speech of the Sumbanese, or, for that matter, the 
Urarina.  The speaker who utters a racial slur is in fact always effectively citing that slur: 
borrowing and repeating it, adopting a formula whose potency has already been proved. 
Its performative force, its capacity to hurt or wound, derives not from the speaker but 
from an accumulated history of usages and the relations of power this history embodies. 
According to Butler, the model of the fully autonomous actor presupposed by our own 
legal system and by Western liberalism more generally, of a sovereign subject whose 
own words alone can magically cause harm to others, is itself ultimately a theological 
construction and a fiction, modelled on the divine power to name and call into being that 
which is named. 
Given growing popular concern for the ecological catastrophe wrought by modern 
culture’s failed mode of relating to nature, the introduction of a substantive moral 
dimension into analyses of ontological encounter and difference is welcome indeed. 
Western thought has long taken individual autonomy, and its premise of a bounded sense 
of self, to be the true basis of moral responsibility and accountability, while 
systematically divesting nature of its social and therefore moral value. Similarly, 
replacing convention and authority as bases for making moral decisions with 
autonomously derived principles of justice has long been explicitly construed as an 
emancipatory activity. Yet it is noteworthy that the advanced division of labour under 
capitalism effectively permits each individual to enjoy a discrete moral identity and sense 
of responsibility, while the destructive impact of society as a whole remains largely 
unencumbered by moral concerns. Ironically, as we are compelled to revise some of the 
assumptions so cherished by Wielenga and his colleagues, it may be in no small part due 
to their ethical limitations. 
1. Butler, J., Excitable speech: a politics of the performative, New York and 
London: Routledge, 1997.  
 
